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Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From a historical perspective, the mitigating measures, specified in the just war 
criteria posited by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica1, provided the justifiable 
rationale for the use of force against a nation’s unwarranted attack.2 In this paper, I will 
attempt to find whether recent analytical tools of interpretation faithfully capture Aquinas 
as possessing a presumption against war when he put together his just war theory.  
It has always been the case that war, as a corrective restraint against various forms 
of injustice, was never considered to be a morally condemnable act.3  However, post 
World War II events - such as those seen in the Holocaust – along with technological 
advancements in biological, chemical and nuclear armaments, have begged the question 
whether the understanding of the traditional just war theory should be the correct starting 
point for moral reflection on the use of force. With the increase of the potential for mass 
destruction, the classical just war tradition has become the target of scrutiny of which 
many believe to be in need of a new outlook. 
With this realization for the potential for widespread destruction, a revision of the 
topic of war within contemporary Catholic dogma, - seen in the U.S. Bishops 1983 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Aquinas’s treatise on war can be found in IIaIIae, question 40. 
 
2 St. Augustine provided initial, rudimentary elements of just war theory throughout his writings.  However, it 
was Aquinas who was able to fully synthesize these elements into a formulation of just war criteria regarding a war to 
be just when fought with the proper authority, for a just cause and with the right intention. In essence, these criteria 
addressed two issues.  The first answered the question when is it right to resort to armed force (jus ad bellum).  The 
second, addressed the appropriate behavior one should exhibit when using such force (jus in bello).  While these two 
issues are related, the classical medieval understanding of the use of force as a legitimate means of action was never 
seriously questioned. 
 
3 That the resort to war in itself was never considered to be a moral issue from Aquinas’s point of view can be 
seen when we examine his comments regarding just intention. In the Summa Theologica II-II Q.40 art. 1 we see 
Aquinas quoting Augustine as saying: “True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives 
of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”  
It is only when it is fought with the negative characteristics listed by Augustine that makes it morally reprehensible.   
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pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, - has sought to provide a moral foundation from 
which all decisions pertaining to war should start. The bishops’ state: 
The church’s teaching on war and peace establishes a strong presumption against war 
which is binding on all; it then examines when this presumption may be overridden, 
precisely in the name of preserving the kind of peace which protects human dignity and 
human rights.4 
 
Adding:  
 
… how we treat our enemy is the key test of whether we love our neighbor; and the  
possibility of taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider in fear and  
trembling.5 
 
 
Significant to this revision is a redefining of the topic of war that seeks to 
establish a convergence between the historical understanding of just war thinking with 
the benevolent, non-violent tenets found within pacifism. This convergence recognizes a 
presumptive orientation against war, allowing it to be overridden in some cases in order 
to preserve “the kind of peace which protects human dignity and human rights.” The 
reclassification of just war ideology has changed the landscape of moral discussion 
regarding the thoughts of Aquinas as he put his criteria for a just war together.  Once seen 
as a presumptive deterrent to injustice, war is now classified as a morally reprehensible 
act in need of justification whenever the obligatory statute to never harm has been 
violated.  
Some scholars find reason to believe that with a “proper” understanding of 
Aquinas’s Summa, a presumptive attitude against war can be seen.  This “proper” 
understanding finds its justification through the use of modern analytical tools enshrined 
in “the logic of prima facie duties” along with a presumptive language against harm. It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1983). par. 70 
 
5 Ibid., par. 80.  
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argued that when these analytical tools are applied to the Summa, a presumptive attitude 
against war emerges.  In fact, not only does it emerge, but it is asserted that this was 
Aquinas’s position all along.6    
Richard B. Miller sees no reason to doubt that Thomas did indeed provide the 
ethical constructs of a just war according to the logic of “prima facie duties” and the 
“presumption against harm”7 thereby justifying a common starting point between just war 
and pacifism.  Although justice was always viewed as the impetus for Aquinas’s 
treatment of war in which coercive force did not need any qualifiers for its 
implementation, a reconstruction of Thomas’s moral compass has occurred allowing for 
belligerent actions, albeit through the filter of pacifistic ideology.  This recent postulation 
(one in which there exists a convergence between pacifism and just war), is a new shift 
within Catholic dogma.8  The question is whether such a shift can be validated to show 
that this was indeed Aquinas’s ethical position as he formulated his thoughts on war.  
Richard Miller seems to think that it does.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 James F. Childress seeks to make sense of the just war ciritera by asserting how they, “can be illuminated 
by the language of prima facie obligations,” in which coercive force is justified only when all other moral 
considerations have been considered. However, James T. Johnson, believes that Childress “employs these criteria as 
categories abstracted from their traditionally informed content seeking to provide a ‘rational reconstruction’ of them 
apart from such content.” To Johnson, this assertion is ill conceived for the reason that Childress “never examines any 
of the actual positions taken by historical figures who have shaped the normative content of just war tradition”, adding, 
“they are irrelevant to his style of argument.” See James F. Childress, “Just-War Criteria,” in his Moral Responsibility 
in Conflicts: Essays on Nonviolence, War, and Conscience (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), p. 
67. Also, see James Turner Johnson, “Comment,” Journal of Religious Ethics 26 (Spring 1998): 220. 
 
7 Richard B. Miller, “Aquinas and the Presumption against Killing and War.” In The Journal of Religion 82 
(2002), 173-204. 
 
8 John Howard Yoder (1927-1997), professor of theology and ethics at the University of Notre Dame and best 
known for his defense of Christian pacifism, acknowledges how this new shift is “an innovation in Roman Catholic 
thought.”  He goes on to state that, “no earlier approval of principled pacifism is found in Roman Catholic magisterial 
texts in modern times.”  See John Howard Yoder, The War of the Lamb: The Ethics of Nonviolence and Peacemaking 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2009), 86. 
 
9 Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez disagrees with Miller concluding, “the view that just war doctrine begins with a 
presumption against war and converges with pacifism is unsound.” See his article, “A Note on the Relation of Pacifism 
and Just-War Theory: Is There a Thomistic Convergence?, Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 59:2 (1995) 
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Gregory M. Reichberg contends that scholars, such as Miller, who wish to argue 
in favor of a Thomistic allegiance to pacifistic inclinations, “proceed from a mistaken 
reading of the medieval theologian’s writing on just war.”10  Reichberg maintains that 
Miller has too quickly assumed that Thomas intended to place war in “direct continuity 
with the exigencies of theological charity”11, whereby non-violence serves as the ethical 
springboard from which Aquinas wished to advance his just war ideology. 
 A few issues are at stake within this discussion.  First, is the matter of 
hermeneutical integrity when deciphering the writings of Aquinas by using the recent, 
rigorous analytical tools of twenty-first century ethics such as those found in the “logic of 
prima facie duties” along with a “presumptive language against harm.” To be sure a 
serious inquiry into the underlying motives of the just war position should be sought; 
however, such an inquiry should be aware of dubious conclusions that find their basis on 
anachronistic interpretations of ancient texts.  So, a degree of caution must be called upon 
to safeguard any proposal that has a moral agenda that favors non-violence over violence.  
Second, if it is found that Aquinas discreetly voiced an affinity with pacifism, 
then the logical outworking of pacifistic ideology should be allowed a larger voice within 
the political arena of statecraft.  Clearer objectives for the promotion of conscientious 
oppositions to war would serve to influence the negotiating capabilities of governments, 
thereby holding just war theorists accountable to a higher moral theory. The importance 
of peace over conflict would seem to be advantageous and advisible given the increasing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Gregory M. Reichberg. “Thomas Aquinas Between Just War and Pacifism,” Journal of Religious Ethics 38 
(2010): 220. 
 
11 Ibid., 239.  In essence, since Aquinas’s treatise on war is placed within his section on the theological virtue 
of charity, it is assumed by Miller that Aquinas is thereby qualifying war’s actions from the motivations of benevolent 
love found within the Christian faith.  The reason for this position is seen when Miller utilizes prima facie reasoning, 
comparing love for enemies against the duty to execute justice.   
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potential for global mass destruction as nuclear deterrent initiatives play an increasing 
role in current affairs.12   
Since the main focus of these discussions centers on the thoughts of Thomas 
Aquinas, the thesis I am offering is a comparative analysis between Richard Miller and 
Gregory Reichberg and how each interprets Aquinas’s thoughts on war within the Summa 
Theologica.13  With that in mind, an investigation to discover whether the ethical tools of 
“the logic of prima facie duties” along with the “language for a presumption against 
harm” correctly reveals an ethical orientation held by Aquinas that favored a belief that 
opposed killing and war.  To be more succinct, can these ethical tools faithfully exegete 
Aquinas’s thoughts within the Summa to show that he possessed a negative outlook on 
harming others when he formulated his just war ideology?  Miller has concluded that 
those wishing to “reconstruct Aquinas’s argument using these modern terms and 
categories are justified in doing so.”14  By contrast, Reichberg finds no justification in the 
use of these terms to interpret a Thomistic disposition favoring non-violence.  On the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 My thoughts concerning this point are centered around the reported advancements of nuclear capability 
within the country of Iran and their well documented antagonism toward the nation of Israel.   I believe it’s important to 
make an interesting distinction regarding the topic of “peace”.   For in one sense, the U.S. Bishops letter seems to 
define “peace” as the absence of war.  However, Joseph E. Capizzi has pointed out how the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, no. 2304 has defined “peace” as not merely the absence of war, but as an outworking of justice in order to 
secure the ‘tranquillity of order’. Such “securing”, ensures the dignity of persons as their rights to goods and ‘free 
communication among men’ are preserved.  So, although it is given that peace over conflict is desirable, the kind of 
peace hoped for becomes important. See Joseph E. Capizzi, “On Behalf of the Neighbor: A Rejection of the 
Complementarity of Just-War Theory and Pacifism”, Studies in Christian Ethics, no.14 (2001): 87-108. 
 
13 No doubt, there are other texts written by Aquinas that can be drawn upon, however, since both authors 
relegate their discussion within the work of the Summa, I thought it best to focus on this work as opposed to others. 
. 
14 J. Bryan Hehir professor at Harvard’s Divinity School also supports the use of these categories as 
interpretive means to reinforce the finding of both Childress and Miller.  He states that because“…Augustine and 
Aquinas did not use the categories does not demonstrate that using these corrupts their theories of legitimating war in 
defense of justice.  See “In Defense of Justice”, Commonweal, (2000) 33. 
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contrary, Reichberg maintains, “if anything, Thomas proceeded from a presumption 
against pacifism, rather than, as has been alleged, from a presumption against war.”15 
In providing my analysis, I will detail the argument put forth by Miller in chapter 
two, who uses these analytical constructs to illustrate how Aquinas possessed a 
presumption of pacifistic ideals through a number of ways within the Summa.  Among 
these are: 
1. His efforts to show how Thomas’s patterns of reasoning conform to the ethical 
theory of prima facie duties.  
2. How Aquinas’s ethical orientation is one of non-violence by way in which he 
stacks his objections in the quaestio on war.   
3. How Thomas presupposes an attitude that goes against killing by his comments 
regarding the divine precepts found within the New Testament, which denounce 
the use of retaliatory force in the face of injustice.16   
And lastly,  
4. How Aquinas’s response to the related issues of tyranny and sedition serve as 
paradigmatic cases in which a presumption against harm is assumed.   
Once these are explained, in chapter three I will then turn to Gregory Reichberg’s 
interpretive analysis of Aquinas’s writings within the Summa, detailing distinctive 
critiques in which he either provides further elaborations on Miller’s evaluation or 
outright rejects his interpretive conclusions regarding the kind of ethical disposition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Reichberg, 237. 
 
16 The first New Testament verse Aquinas mentions is found in Matthew 5:38, 39 in which Jesus states, “You 
have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’  But I say to you, Do not resist the one who is 
evil.  But if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.”  And the second verse is found in Romans 
12:17, in which Paul states, “Repay no one evil for evil, but give thought to do what is honorable in the sight of all.”   
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Aquinas held.  I will show how Reichberg differs with Miller in some key areas.  
Namely: 
1. How a perception of the act of war as being sinful due to the opening title in Q.40 
is mistaken due to a lack of understanding on how the Summa was originally 
drafted. 
2. How contrary to Miller, Aquinas’s use of the objections listed in Q.40 did not 
presuppose a moral affinity toward pacifism. 
3. How war’s placement within Aquinas’s treatise on charity does not support a 
presumption against harm. 
4. How a presumption against harm cannot be substantiated based upon the New 
Testament biblical texts that support pacifistic ideals.  
I will then compare these arguments in chapter four, highlighting any 
strengths and weaknesses of each in an effort to ascertain which scholar has put 
forth the more persuasive case.  Chapter five will consist of my own thoughts 
regarding any key concepts either scholar may not have developed more fully that 
may be vital in determining Aquinas’s actual disposition toward war. And lastly, 
chapter six will serve as my concluding remarks.   
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Chapter Two 
 
MILLER’S ARGUMENT 
 
 The modus operandi behind the just war theory can be found within the restrictive 
mandates of its criteria put forth by Thomas Aquinas in IIaIIae Q. 40.   In this chapter, I 
provide a breakdown of Richard Miller’s position where a convergence between just war 
and pacifism is argued based upon the recent use of analytical tools placed upon 
Aquinas’s most notable work, the Summa Theologica.     
Since the criteria are commonly viewed as exceptions allowing for the justifiable 
use of force, the belief is that a preliminary presumption against harm must be in place in 
order for such criteria to be necessary. For this reason, just war theory and pacifism 
should not be viewed as concepts incompatible with one another, but rather convergent 
theories, possessing the common ground of non-violence as their basis, from which all 
moral conduct should derive.  
Thomas’s Patterns of Reasoning 
 Miller seeks to justify this presumptive orientation against harm by first 
identifying patterns of reasoning found within the mind of Aquinas as he dealt with 
various precepts and virtues in the Summa.  These patterns play a significant role in the 
relevancy they command toward Thomas’s thoughts on war. Miller explains how: 
First, Thomas classifies an act as intrinsically good, bad, or indifferent.  Some acts are acceptable 
or unacceptable by definition, and part of Aquinas’s moral theology provides a taxonomy of 
paradigmatic cases…Second, Aquinas specifies the meaning of a virtue or precept by indicating 
precisely how it is meant to be understood.  In this respect, he restricts the range of a virtue or a 
precept’s application, taking a broad, general idea and showing how it is meant to be 
circumscribed…Third, Thomas reasons by analogy from paradigmatic classifications to other 
cases drawing inferences from settled cases or definitions when considering the morality of similar 
problems…Fourth, after virtues or precepts have been specified, Aquinas will rank or weigh them 
when they appear to conflict.  That ranking, in turn, draws on a more general hierarchy of value, in 
which some virtues (i.e., faith, hope, charity) are considered superior to others (e.g., courage, 
justice, temperance, prudence).17 	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Miller sees these patterns being consistent with the logic of prima facie 
obligations in which competing virtues are “pitted” against each other and appraised as to 
their level of importance.18  The issue is an important one. For in essence, the debate 
regarding the ethical inclinations of Aquinas is “whether his pattern of reasoning is one of 
specification alone or whether it also includes ranking rival virtues or precepts” as 
illustrated in Miller’s fourth point above.19   
Since for centuries the Catholic Church’s understanding of the Thomistic 
treatment of war has been one that is defined through the restrictive lens of justice alone,  
the emergence of the interpretive tools under review has given rise for Miller to state how 
“a careful examination of pertinent materials…will show that the language of prima facie 
duties is compatible with his [Aquinas’s] reasoning.”20 Thus, Thomas’s justification of 
war is only brought about by the recognition that a presumptive duty (the duty not to 
harm) has been outweighed in favor of war’s occurrence.  As seen earlier, the Catholic 
Church’s position on war thus cannot be framed within the limited conceptualization of 
justice alone; but rather is justified only when other presumptive precepts and values 
have been superseded.  
The first of four ways in which Miller seeks to legitimize a pacifistic presumption 
within the mind of Aquinas has just been discussed.  Namely, how the logic of prima 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Miller, “Aquinas and the Presumption against Killing and War.” 178.  He identifies four patterns in total.  
Although he sees all four patterns in operation within the Summa Theologica, through his own admission, he will focus 
“primarily on issues of specifying precepts and ranking or weighing rival precepts”, in order to make his case. Hence, 
these will be the ones pertinent to my discussion.  
   
18 Miller quotes Childress in providing an understanding of what prima facie duties are, stating that “certain 
features of acts that have a certain tendency to make an act right or wrong claim our attention.  But our actual 
obligation depends upon the act in its wholeness and entirety.” See Miller, p.174.  
 
19 Miller, 178.  
 
20 Ibid.  
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facie duties comports with established patterns of reasoning employed by Thomas within 
the Summa. When two conflicting duties present themselves, each are weighed in order to 
ascertain which duty emerges as the appropriate one to act upon.  
We now move to Miller’s second and third attempt to substantiate this presumed 
disposition of nonviolence by taking a closer look at the article on war within the Summa 
Theologica itself and how the objections delineated by Thomas encapsulate further a 
prima facie conceptualization of duties.  In addition, we will look closely at two New 
Testament texts found in one of Aquinas’s objections, which pacifists like to employ in 
order to substantiate their position of non-violence.    
The Stacking of Objections and 
New Testament Texts 
 
It is Miller’s belief that since Aquinas stacks the objections in Q.40 to support an 
apparent presumption against war, Thomas must therefore consider “nonviolent values as 
foundational in prompting moral questioning into the ethics of war.”  His justification for 
this centers on the work of M. D. Chenu, who interprets the overall purpose of the 
quaestio as a reconciliation of conflicting opinions into a “higher synthesis whereby the 
truth of each [objection] could be confirmed.”  This ‘synthesis’, allows Miller to utilize 
Chenu’s analysis of the quaestio, the common literary genre used by medieval 
theologians, to conclude that the “value of non-violence…generates the intellectual 
clearing within which he [Aquinas] develops his inquiry” since all the objections seek to 
prescribe war as an immoral act.21   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  For a detailed discussion see M. D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, trans. A-M. Landry and D. 
Hughes (Chicago: Regnery, 1964).   
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Of the four objections listed by Aquinas, Miller focuses his attention on the 
second, implying how war goes against the New Testament texts of Matthew 5:39 in 
which we see Jesus calling others “not [to] resist an evil person; but whoever slaps you 
on your right cheek, turn the other to him also, and Paul’s edict never to “take your own 
revenge…but leave room for the wrath of God…” found in Romans 12:19.   Since Jesus 
seems to categorically prohibit the use of force against aggression, Miller is able to assert 
that any retaliatory response to injustice by a Christian is viewed to be morally 
reprehensible.  Love or charity should be the influence behind our interactions with our 
enemies.  The divine ownership of vengeance is an action that would be reserved solely 
for God.  Such ownership must not under any circumstance be usurped by the actions of 
men, seeking to take matters into their own hands.     
He sees Aquinas’s response to this objection closely adhering to the pattern of 
reasoning identified above.  Namely, by showing how the virtue of charity - defined as 
neighborly love toward enemies - should be ‘borne’ in readiness of mind, Thomas seems 
to indicate that the virtue of charity should be the motivating force behind situations in 
which conflicts arise.  Miller interprets this as an implied presumption against harm in 
which a negative attitude toward killing and war serves as the best explanation for why 
Thomas would respond to this objection the way in which he has.  He states: 
Most important, charity requires that Christians “should be prepared to love even a particular 
enemy,” a preparation “required by an attitude of mind…if real necessity arises. Aquinas thus 
clarifies the commandment’s meaning by saying that it generally pertains to inward disposition 
rather than outward action…The virtue of charity points to the good of nonviolence, for which 
Christians should be disposed and prepared.22  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid. 185 
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Moreover, for Miller this exegesis of the objection elucidates the logic of prima 
facie duties while at the same time incorporating a clear language of presumption against 
harm. For, although Aquinas notes how the divine command not to resist “should be 
borne in readiness of mind,” there are moments in which one must act contrary to this 
directive for the common good, thereby overriding an initial obligation placed upon the 
person’s moral action.  Miller emphasizes the point stating, “Here, his [Aquinas’s] 
pattern of reasoning does not specify the requirements of justice but weights justice 
against rival goods and corresponding duties,”23 thereby, clarifying moral conduct within 
a prima facie conceptualization. 
So far, we have summarized three attempts offered by Miller in which he seeks to 
assert that Aquinas possessed a presumption against harm through the use of prima facie 
duties along with a presumptive language against the use of force that favors non-
violence.  It was presented that a Thomistic moral affinity toward non-violence was the 
framework from which Aquinas operated based upon his stacking of objections in Q.40.  
In addition, a denunciation toward coercive force was offered based upon biblical texts 
that condemned retaliatory actions in the face of injustice. However, occasions to 
supersede this presumptive attitude may be warranted in certain circumstances. I will 
now move to Miller’s last point in which the ethical disposition to pacifism is fortified 
through the examples of sedition and tyranny. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Miller, 187. 
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Other Paradigmatic Cases 
Strengthening his case further, Miller seeks to uncover Aquinas’s ethics by the 
way Thomas deals with the special cases of tyranny and sedition found within the 
Summa.  Upon initial reflection, both these cases seem to be treated by way of 
specification of justice alone.  Thomas labels these issues as inherently wrong, finding no 
justification for them at all.  However, Miller reveals that more than justice is at stake 
when a closer examination of the text is undertaken.  Although it may seem that “Aquinas 
appears to frame these issues without reference to a presumption against harm…”24 other 
issues need to be examined that involves more specificity then justice alone.  The virtues 
of peace and civic order also play a significant role in determining what the proper course 
of action should be when a society is subjected to an oppressive regime.   
According to Thomas, a ruler can be guilty of sedition by enforcing unjust laws 
that are beneficial not for the common good, but for the private good of the ruler.  
Aquinas classifies such a ruler as tyrannical.  Consequently, he sees nothing wrong in 
seeking to dispose such a ruler unless “the tyrant’s rule be disturbed so inordinately, that 
his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant’s 
government.”25   For Aquinas, some measure of injustice might have to be endured so 
civil order may be preserved.  Any contemplation regarding the removal of a tyrant must 
involve a proper proportion between the good of his removal versus any increasing harm 
that may be inflicted upon the community.   
Miller sees this as a moral trade-off, in which the recognition of one value may 
threaten the value of another.  For Aquinas, some oppression is considered tolerable, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 191.  
 
25 II-II Q.42, A.2, R3 
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maintaining how it is better to endure injustice than to risk civil lawlessness.  By contrast, 
if the oppression becomes intolerable, Thomas does not see a problem with the taking of 
forceful initiatives to remove a despotic regime.26  
In both the cases of tyranny and sedition, Miller identifies a common thread in 
their application within civil communities.  Each shares a presumption against harm; 
however, actions to overthrow a tyrant must be quantified against potential disruptions to 
the higher civic virtues of peace and order.  Aquinas sees the benefits of these two as the 
amalgamate effects of charity.  Therefore, the engagement of violent aggression must be 
“traded off against the implications of charity when considering the demands of civic 
duty.”27 The cases of tyranny and sedition imply the framework of prima facie duties put 
forth by Miller, in which charity serves as the springboard for a presumption against 
harm orientation.    
Conclusion 
To summarize, Miller endeavors to justify an ethical disposition held by Aquinas 
that favors non-maleficence.  It is his belief that when Thomas’s writings are undertaken 
in toto, a prima facie conceptualization of duties is evident along with a presumption 
against harm.  Consequently, a pacifistic orientation is then discovered serving as the 
underlying motivation for Aquinas’s formulation of his theory on just war.   
The basis for such an argument was drawn from Miller’s perceived patterns of 
reasoning identified within the Summa in which Aquinas ranked virtues and precepts to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
26 Aquinas does not provide a standard of measurement needed to ascertain when the level of injustice 
inflicted by a despotic ruler would be considered intolerable.  This opens the door for subjective interpretations by an 
oppressed people.  What would seem intolerable to one group would seem tolerable to another.  
   
27 Miller, 193. 
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ascertain those values in which the greater good is achieved.  An analysis of the medieval 
quaestio was given, arguing for a presumption against harm based upon Aquinas’s 
stacking of objections in his article on war.  Moreover, further substantiation was argued 
focusing on the New Testament passages that seem to negate any retaliatory force in the 
face of injustice.  Finally, a presumptive attitude against harm was demonstrated by 
Aquinas’s use of the paradigmatic cases of sedition and tyranny.  In the next chapter, I 
will turn to the counterarguments provided by Gregory Reichberg. 
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Chapter Three 
 
REICHBERG’S REBUTTAL 
 
One cannot ignore the arguments put forth by Miller that seeks to advance a 
presumptive meta-ethic of non-violence operative within Aquinas’s moral framework.  
However, his analysis is not immune to critique from opposing scholars wishing to set 
the historical record straight regarding what they believe to be Aquinas’s true moral 
intent.  In this chapter, I will put forth the critique of Gregory Reichberg, who seeks to 
nullify some of the assertions put forth by Miller that was briefly discussed in the 
previous chapter.28   
In his article titled, Thomas Aquinas between Just War and Pacifism, Reichberg 
examines some of Miller’s arguments and is not convinced of their soundness.  It is his 
belief that upon closer examination, weaknesses are present that cannot be ignored.  
According to Reichberg, attempts to situate Aquinas within pacifistic ideology, based 
upon an initial appraisal of article one of Q.40, “proceeds from a mistaken reading of the 
medieval theologian’s writing on just war.”29  In his view, further understandings of the 
overall structure of Aquinas’s Summa Theologica are necessary if a precise formulation 
of his ethical orientation is to be achieved.  
An Inquiry Regarding the Title of Question 40 
To start, Reichberg draws attention to Aquinas’s article on war. He shows how 
the title, “Whether war is always sinful”, is allegedly viewed as evidence that Thomas 
“expressly intended to discuss the sinfulness of war, with the implication that Aquinas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In Reichberg’s examination, he does not address every issue put forth by Miller, only those he deems 
relevant, adding his own perspectives to the overall question whether Aquinas had a presumption against harm. 
 
29 Reichberg, 220. 
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came to the traditional doctrine of just war with strong reservations about its 
applicability.”30 As a result, Aquinas is seen to be a proponent of an ethical orientation 
that favors a presumption against killing and harm. Miller agrees, stating that by “starting 
with the idea that war might be sinful, Aquinas seems to establish a burden of proof in 
favor of nonviolence and against war.”31  
Taking issue with this claim, Reichberg believes the drawing of such a conclusion 
is unwarranted. He finds the assertion unjustifiable due to a lack of a historical 
understanding of how the Summa Theologica was originally written as well as a non-
realization of an undeniable pattern regarding how Aquinas would answer a topic based 
upon an article’s introduction.  He goes on to demonstrate how the individual articles 
expressed in the Summa were originally void of descriptive titles. To be sure, the articles 
“were indeed numbered, but apart from those instances where the author interpolated a 
prefatory comment, each [article] began simply with an enumeration of opening 
objections.”32 
  Thus, Q.40 A.1, which currently has the title, “Whether waging war is always 
sinful?” would have originally read: “Proceeding to the first article, it would seem that 
waging war is always sinful.” However, Reichberg asserts that a more accurate 
representation of the article’s current opening statement (utrum aliquod bellu sit licitum), 
is best rendered, “Whether any war is licit.”33 In Thomas’s time, the term licitum, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid, 220.  
 
31 Miller, Aquinas and the Presumption Against Killing and War, 181.  
 
32 Reichberg, 220. 
  
33 Ibid., 221 
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“permissible”34, was considered to be the standard grammatical construct used by 
medieval theologians and lawyers to evaluate actions “whose normative status was in 
some measure open to doubt.”35 The interrogative “utrum” (whether), seen in many 
article headings within the Summa Theologica, was added in later editions by an editor, 
resulting in the opening query we are now accustomed to seeing. Stemming from this 
title, the enumerative objections related to the query would then follow.  With this in 
mind, a Thomistic presumption against war would then be difficult to show, since the 
descriptive title was not there when the Summa was originally written. 
Continuing, Reichberg points out how the article headings formulated within the 
Secunda-secundae utilizing the licitum term, almost invariably resulted in affirmative 
responses.36  Likewise, an affirmative response is given by Aquinas to those article 
headings “that inquire whether a certain act (y) should be counted a virtue.”37 Hence, if 
the first objection within the article states that an act is not a sin, this gives clear 
indication that Aquinas will affirm within the body of his response how the act in 
question was indeed a sin.  Similarly, when the first objection to an article states how an 
act is not a virtue, Aquinas will point out how it is a virtue within the construct of his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Reichberg states the term licitum “does not share a common linguistic root with lex (law), hence it is best 
rendered by “permissible” or allowable,” rather than “lawful.” See Reichberg, 221.  
 
35 Ibid, 221. 
 
36 Reichberg identifies the single exception contrary to this, which is interestingly found in Q.40 A.1 (the very 
passage under discussion) where the question of “whether waging war is always sinful?” is answered in the negative.  
From this, Reichberg seems to conclude that while the beginnings of other articles that questioned the permissability of 
acts of virtue and vice served as merely rhetorical questions for which Aquinas had no doubt as to their answer, Q.40 
possesses a unique characteristic quite different from all the other articles within the Secunda-Secundae. “This indicates 
that the “De bello” did not fit neatly into the rubric that Aquinas had established in the antecedent question on charity.” 
see Gregory Reichberg, “Aquinas between Just War and Pacifism.” The Journal of Religious Ethics endnote 5. 
 
37 Ibid, 221. 
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rebuttal.  So in short, we see Aquinas taking the opposite view of whatever an article’s 
first objection attempts to substantiate.  
Seeing this as an obvious pattern within the Secunda-secundae, Reichberg is able 
to surmise how, “Aquinas did not approach his material from a neutral standpoint, as 
though the normative valence of the wide range of acts under evaluation was in each case 
equally up for grabs.”38  Rather, a definitive certainty was evident within the mind of 
Aquinas from the very beginning as to how acts should be categorized. By “orienting the 
utrum question around the typology of virtue and vice, he [Aquinas] indicated what 
positive or negative presumption was operative in each individual case.”39   As such, 
Reichberg recommends a more cautious approach to what he deems a hasty conclusion 
made by Miller “that a scholastic article was ‘meant to impel inquiry into a doubtful 
matter.’”40 Inquires framed in terms of permissibility (licitum) should not be necessarily 
interpreted as an affirmative position against the act in question.  Thus, for Reichberg the 
alleged negative presumption against war based upon the title of Q.40 is untenable.  
The Objections Revisited 
Directing his attention to Miller’s claim that the stacking of objections in Q.40 is 
evidence of Aquinas’s presumption against war, Reichberg offers a pedagogical 
breakdown of the quaestio disputata. Recall earlier how Miller bases his argument upon 
M. D. Chenu’s understanding of the quaestio format. There we saw Miller and Chenu 
agreeing that the objections of an article are collaborative elements, able to be unified to 
uncover their overall meaning.  Objections thus serve as a “dialectical procedure in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid., 221. 
 
39 Ibid., 222.  
 
40 Reichberg quoting Miller in Aquinas and the Presumption Against Killing and War. 179 
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a collection of conflicting viewpoints…were reconciled into a higher synthesis wherein 
the truth of each could be affirmed.”41  This synthesis would then be articulated within 
Thomas’s response, thereby bringing clarity to any misunderstandings one may have of a 
given topic.  From this, Miller was able to conclude that since all four objections are 
stacked in favor of a presumption not to harm, this indicated that Thomas recognized how 
“the value of nonviolence, not the virtue of justice, generates the intellectual clearing 
within which he [Aquinas] develops his inquiry.”42 
However, Reichberg argues that a closer reading of Aquinas’s work shows 
different variations in how he dealt with objections throughout the Summa. In some areas, 
Thomas assimilates the objections within his response, elaborating upon them with 
distinctions of which the overall truth is unveiled.  While in other parts, Aquinas either 
offers no synthesis of the objections at all, or in some cases outright denies their 
truthfulness regarding the subject matter altogether.43  
Moving to the objections themselves in Q.40, Reichberg can see no attempt of 
Aquinas to synthesize them within his formulated response, as Miller purposes.  In fact, 
“it will be quickly apparent how these [objections] either are not addressed within the 
responsio, or reach conclusions that are rejected therein.”44  He provides a breakdown of 
how each objection is handled by Aquinas, beginning with the fourth which states that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 M.D. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 93-96. 
 
42 Miller, 183. 
 
43 For example, Reichberg points out how in IIaIIae Q.95, “Whether divination by dreams is illicit?”, Aquinas 
proceeds in a dialectical form, affirming “conclusions from both the objections and the sed contra”, drawing 
distinctions between the various causes of dreams, finding their origins in both natural and divine causes.  However, a 
very different approach is taken by Aquinas regarding the question whether God exists in (I Q. 2, A.3) in which 
Thomas does not take a dialectical approach, but rather by-passes the objections altogether, proceeding then to offer 
proof of God’s existence in five ways.  See Reichberg, 227, 228. 
 
44 Reichberg, 228. 
  
	   21	  
warlike exercises in tournaments are forbidden by the Church.  Reichberg sees this 
objection as having no immediate bearing on the threefold criteria of “just war” as 
discussed by Aquinas.  Likewise, objections one - that calls war a sin based upon the 
punishment that will ensue for those who pick up the sword -  and two, that highlights the 
biblical passages of Matthew 5:39 and Romans 12:19 discussed in the previous chapter,   
are both equally dismissed within the responsio finding no justification in the allegation 
of the sinfulness of war.  Lastly, the third objection – that war is necessarily sinful 
because it is contrary to peace – is discarded due to Aquinas’s “express teaching… that a 
just war is undertaken precisely with the intention of peace.”45  Because of this closer 
reading, Reichberg cannot assent to Miller’s assertion, explaining “In sum…we can see 
how the responsio to Q.40, A.1 does not bear out to Miller’s claim that ‘Thomas’s four 
objections produce a presumption against war,’” insofar as they “‘present weighty but not 
definitive reasons that must be considered when crafting an ethic of just war.’” 
The Subject of War Within the Theological Virtue of Charity 
If you recall in the previous chapter, Miller seemed to indicate that the virtue of 
charity should be the motivating force behind situations in which conflicts arise.  Since 
we find Aquinas’s discussion of war placed within the section on charity, it would seem 
that the presumptive attitude toward nonviolence is the framework from which Thomas 
draws upon when drafting his thoughts on war.   As we turn back to Reichberg’s critique, 
we find him disagreeing with this assertion by giving a contextual understanding of war’s 
positioning within the Summa Theologica.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid., 228. 
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Proceeding to the prologue in Q.39, Reichberg directs us to the itemized list of 
vices given by Aquinas that are contrary to peace. What is interesting to note, is that war 
has been included by Thomas as a vice along with three other deeds, namely schism, 
brawling and sedition.   It is clear that when one reads the articles associated with these 
three, a sinful categorization is given in one way or another.  Reichberg suspects that “in 
light of this treatment, one would expect his [Aquinas’s] account of war to follow the 
same path…”46   
However, an abrupt shift occurs when Aquinas approaches the topic of war in Q. 
40.  Rather than provide an elaboration for why war would be unequivocally denounced 
as sinful, Aquinas proceeds to explain on what conditions war can be considered just.    
As Reichberg states: 
Clearly, some special characteristic sets apart “war” from “schism,” “brawling” and “sedition.”  
While it would be contradictory to speak of a “just schism,” a “just brawling” or a “just sedition” 
(the three terms denote sin and sin only), “war” alone permits subclassification into good and bad 
kinds…There is a patent discrepancy between, on the one hand, the theme of war as announced in 
the prologue to Q.39, and the actual treatment of this theme, on the other.47 
 
This “subclassification” of war “into good and bad kinds” allows Reichberg to 
conclude “It was thus the dynamics of unjust war (a sin he [Aquinas] simply names 
“bellum”), rather than the exigencies of just war, that originally prompted Aquinas to 
take up the moral problem of war in his treatise on charity.”48 Moreover, Reichberg 
assumes the overall objective of Aquinas’s insertion of war within the section on charity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Reichberg, 224. 
  
47 Ibid., 224. 
 
48 Ibid., 224. 
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was to “demonstrate how wrongful war, along with other conflict-causing vices such as 
discord and schism stands opposed to the concordia that flows from charity.”49  
Again, Reichberg cautions against arriving at a rash conclusion – as the one 
Miller seems to take - that just war must be qualified by the demands of charity.  Further 
elaborations are necessary, so an understanding of Aquinas’s logistical positioning of the 
topic of war can be achieved. To bind the moral actions of just war theorists through the 
exigencies of charity alone is too quick an assertion for Reichberg to assent.  At the very 
least, the main emphasis he wishes to convey is that “it was not just war, but rather its 
opposite, unjust war, that dictated the inclusion of the former within the treatise on 
charity.”50  
The Proper Interpretation of the Biblical Texts 
We now move from a contextual look of wars positioning in the Summa to 
Reichberg’s rebuttal of a presumption against harm evidenced in the mind of Aquinas 
based upon various biblical texts that seem to condemn belligerent conflict.   
 He spends the remainder of his article examining the New Testament passages 
(Matthew 5: 38, 39, 43, 44), commonly used by pacifists to justify their ideological 
stance. According to Miller, the main rationale for a presumptive ethic of non-violence 
by Thomas is seen in Aquinas’s comments regarding these divine precepts, which 
denounce any retaliatory force in the face of injustice.  Reichberg offers an interpretative 
analysis of the “do not resist evil” passage (Matthew 5:39), illustrating how Aquinas 
understood the meaning of this verse.  He seeks to provide a strong relevance between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid., 224. 
 
50 Ibid., 225. 
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imperative command of Christ and the classic doctrine of just war to which Thomas 
espoused.  According to Reichberg: 
 
[I]t was incumbent on Thomas to explain how these phrases might be understood  
differently, and, to his mind, more accurately, than in the pacifist interpretation whereby  
these precepts were thought to rule out the very possibility of a just war.51 
 
 
In providing his analysis of Thomas’s understanding regarding the meaning of 
these passages, Reichberg asserts how Aquinas sought to dispel interpretive errors put 
forth by two opposing camps. The first were those of the Gentiles, who maintained that to 
follow the command of non resistance toward evil, would result in the complete 
destruction of public life, “because society cannot be maintained against disturbances 
without the imposition of punishment against evildoers.” The other were probably those 
of the Cathars, viewed as a heretical group, “who maintained that all vengeance should be 
ruled out in observance of the Gospel law, even if this should undermine the social 
order.”52  
Reichberg shows how Thomas’s response was “two-pronged.” Arguing against 
the Cathars, Thomas claimed that the prohibition against resistance to evil was not God’s 
intention when it came to matters “undertaken for love of the public good (ex amore 
publici boni).53  
Contrary to the Gentiles, the (Matthew 5:39) directive to “not resist evil” should 
be understood as an imperative that should be observed within the Church.  “Christians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Reichberg, 229.  
 
52 Ibid., 230. 
   
53 Ibid., 230.  Interestingly, Reichberg is not averse to point out how Aquinas makes the similar point in Q.40, 
A.1, Ad.2, in which the directive of (Matt 5:39) should be within the forefront of the mind, however “sometimes it is 
necessary to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom we are fighting.” 
 
	   25	  
should be inwardly prepared to desist from self-defense, and to refrain from retaliating 
for harm done, thereby undergoing hardship and even death, if such will prove spiritually 
beneficial to the neighbor.”54  According to Reichberg, the issue for Aquinas was one of 
distinction between the roles of those of church and state.  In sum, violence had no place 
within the church, however, within the temporal sphere of political sovereignty, coercive 
force is justifiable as a corrective means in restraining deviant behavior that seeks to 
jeopardize the welfare of the common good.55  Identifying with the epistle written by 
Paul to the Romans (chapter 13), Reichberg asserts: 
God had instituted a public authority (princes) to impose penalties for malfeasance, such that 
private individuals were prohibited from taking initiative in this domain.  Hence, those who 
permissibly resist evil for love of the common good are first and foremost princes, judges, 
soldiers, and others who have responsibility for maintaining public order.56  
 
Contending that Aquinas was postulating for a prohibitive directive given to the 
clergy not to engage in acts of war, Reichberg asserts Thomas’s understanding of the 
phrase (“not to resist evil”), “was not meant to prohibit punishment altogether, since in 
particular cases active resistance to evildoing might very well be apposite.”57 Hence, 
Aquinas’s understanding, as read by Reichberg, of the New Testament verse was not 
meant as a precept, but a counsel, affording an individual the opportunity – if they so 
desired – to offer nonresistance from an attacking assailant.  An exhibition of self-
sacrificing love when faced with egregious actions by an assailant was certainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid., 231. 
 
55 Further elaboration will be offered in chapter five regarding this topic.  
 
56 Ibid., 231. 
 
57 Ibid., 232. 
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meritorious. Justifiable violence could find no place within the clergy.  However, armed 
force “could legitimately be used by civil authorities to maintain peace.”58   
Conclusion 
Recapping what was just discussed, we have explored counterarguments to an 
ethical disposition allegedly held by Aquinas that favors a presumption against harm and 
subsequently war. Reichberg has illustrated that claims to label such a presumption 
within the mind of Aquinas can’t be legitimized for a number of reasons.   
First, efforts to show an implied disapproval of war based upon the article’s 
insinuation of its sinfulness were incorrect due to a lack of historical understanding of 
how the article was originally formulated.  Second, the stacking of objections found in 
Q.40 in order to collectively synthesize the overall truth favoring nonviolence was 
problematic due to Aquinas’s variations in how he dealt with the objections throughout 
the Summa. Third, a negative outlook toward war’s applicability can be seen due its 
inclusion in Aquinas’s section on charity wasn’t justified when a contextual analysis of 
why war was placed within this section was offered.  Lastly, no presumption against war 
could be substantiated based upon biblical texts that supported pacifistic ideals.   
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Chapter Four 
 
MILLER AND REICHBERG COMPARED 
We have now laid out both arguments from each scholar.  It is evident that both 
reach a different conclusion regarding the question whether Aquinas possessed a 
presumption against harm in his assessment of war.  The task before us now is to 
examine both arguments to ascertain which scholar provides the correct representation of 
Aquinas’s thoughts regarding war’s justification. To answer this, let us focus on the 
issues that each scholar touched upon.   
If you recall in chapter one, I highlighted four areas of concentration in which 
Miller sought to demonstrate how Aquinas had a presumption toward pacifistic ideals.  
These were 1) by identifying patterns of reasoning that conform to the theory of prima 
facie obligations.  2) by the way in which Aquinas stacks the objections listed in Q. 40.  
3) by focusing on biblical passages that seem to denounce the use of retaliatory force.  
And 4) by seeing Thomas’s use of the topics of sedition and tyranny as paradigmatic 
cases in which a presumption against harm can be assumed.   
I believe Reichberg responds to all four areas presented by Miller.  In this chapter, 
I will attempt to communicate these responses and determine whether they were 
successful in casting doubt on Miller’s conclusions.  I will also provide ancillary 
comments where necessary in order to enhance a particular thought that neither scholar 
developed fully enough that may be pertinent to the discussion. 
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Do the Objections Show a Presumption of Nonviolence? 
In comparing the writings of both, a point of contention seems to be evident on 
how each scholar sees Thomas utilizing the list of objections proposed in Q.40 regarding 
the topic of war.   Miller sees a clear negative attitude toward war held by Thomas by the 
way in which these objections are stacked.  Because of this he is able to assert that the 
“value of non-violence… generated the intellectual clearing within which he [Aquinas] 
develops his inquiry.”59  
Reichberg disagrees, dismissing this attempt to synthesize Aquinas’s objections to 
show a presumptive attitude favoring non-violence.  In his view, no amalgamation of the 
objections in an effort to find a higher meaning is necessary or warranted. Reichberg sees 
no need to go any further other than to claim that Aquinas’s responses to the objections 
are quite clear in their attempt to nullify any misconceptions offered by the opposing 
view.  For Reichberg, if we simply take the objections at face value, without reading any 
other motive behind their inception, it becomes clear that Thomas’s main intent was to 
shoot down the claims of these objections within his response.  Jeffrey Stout agrees 
stating,  “…it is only misunderstandings of one sort or another that create a presumption 
against waging war…, Aquinas’s aim is to help readers beyond overly simple 
presumptions like this and toward a comprehension of the conditions under which waging 
war can be just.”  Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez is also in agreement stating, “…Aquinas 
wants to rebut some mistaken replies his readers might give to the question of Christian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Reichberg, 183 
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participation in war, and to specify those conditions which make warfare the morally 
right and binding thing to do.”60  
In my estimation, Reichberg is correct.  The stacking of objections posited by 
Miller to show a presumption against harm cannot be maintained for the simple reason 
that we do not see Aquinas utilizing objections in this manner when other articles within 
the Summa are examined.   Perhaps a few examples can illustrate this point.  In IaIIae, 
Q.4, A1, Aquinas stacks objections that presume God is imperfect.  Are we to therefore 
conclude that Thomas held to a presumption that God was less than perfect?  We would 
have to if we were to follow Miller’s logic.  Similarly, in IIaIIae, Q.23, A3, Aquinas 
stacks objections against charity being a virtue.  Again, are we to infer from this that 
Aquinas did not believe charity was a virtue? I think not.  These examples make the force 
of Miller’s argument on this particular point less convincing.   The acceptance of his 
conclusion regarding Aquinas’s objections toward the article on war does not yield the 
same result when we apply his conjecture to other parts of the Summa.61  Therefore, the 
presumptive attitude against harm seems untenable and unable to garner enough support.   
Furthermore, for Miller to suggest that within an article’s opening objections, 
“there is an effort to embody the truth that the opposing position contains within a wider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Jeffrey Stout, “Justice and Resort to War: A Sampling of Christian Ethical Thinking,” in Cross, Crescent 
and Sword : The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, ed. James Turner Johnson and 
John Kelsay (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1990). Also see Fernandez “A Note on the Relation of Pacifism and Just-
War Theory: Is There a Thomistic Convergence?, Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, 59:2 (1995).  Miller 
believes both these scholars are correct, however, he goes on to say “but it is inaccurate to conclude that the objections 
are only pretenders to truth.  They are not false per se but only when they are interpreted as unqualified objections to 
war.  Their truth must be properly conceived, and Aquinas sets out to clarify their veracity in his replies to the 
objections…” However, per Reichberg it is hard to assent to Miller’s assertion of a presumptive attitude against war 
without reading too much into the text.  
   
61 To push the matter one step further, we see in IIaIIae Q.25, Aquinas stacks the objections against 
Christians loving their enemies through the virtue of charity, why doesn’t Miller argue for Aquinas having a 
presumptive attitude against loving enemies, since he argues for Aquinas having one against war based upon the same 
methodology?  One can argue that a clear case of special pleading is being employed that can be seen as a bias that 
favors nonviolence.  Since Miller has this presupposition, its no wonder that he is able to show this within Aquinas’s 
text.   
 
	   30	  
framework which… underwrites its truthfulness,” seems to go beyond the original intent 
of Aquinas’s thoughts and into the realm of speculation.  Reasoning along these lines 
overlooks the consistent formative patterns already existing within the Summa regarding 
Thomas’s use of the objections and the position he would take based upon their implied 
presumption.  
For example, when the first objection of an article seems to establish a negative 
presumption toward the initial inquiry, this gives a clear indication that Aquinas will 
demonstrate within the body how the acceptance of such a presumption would be 
mistaken.  As a case in point, in I-II Q.31 A.1 Aquinas’s first objection states “It would 
seem that delight is not a passion.”  However, in his response, Thomas mentions how 
delight “is a passion of the soul.”  Likewise, Thomas’s first objection in I-II Q.81 A.3 
states how “it would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted…to all men,” 
to which he retorts that “original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by 
Adam…” Therefore, to state that Aquinas is making an attempt to draw out the 
conglomerate truthfulness of each objection in order to show his allegiance to its position 
is unsubstantiated.  If anything, the pattern within the Summa shows that when an article 
tries to substantiate a certain presumption, Aquinas would reject this as being untrue.  
Miller’s attempt to apply this reasoning to the article on war and the objections therein, 
seeks to solidify a particular presumption held by Aquinas (namely non-violence), where 
one does not exist.  
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The Virtue of Charity and Its Implications 
Since we cannot seem to find an allegiance toward nonviolence by the way 
Aquinas stacks the objections, perhaps the presumptive disposition against war can be 
established elsewhere. Miller maintains that Aquinas held a presumption against harm 
when he quotes New Testament passages that denounce the use of force in the face of 
injustice.  
In Thomas’s second objection listed in Q.40, Miller believes that by citing the 
divine commands of Matthew 5:39 and Romans 12:19, “a more focused presumption is 
found,” one that “coheres with the pattern of reasoning associated with prima facie duties 
and the language of a presumption against harm.”62 Miller identifies this prima facie duty 
as the good of non-violence, which on occasion may be circumvented by a competing 
duty that requires the protection of the common good.  This also seems to be the 
reasoning of Andre Marie Dubarle who believes the divine imperatives found within the 
New Testament should “be understood as a statement of a hierarchy of values” in which 
their “immediate and remote context must be taken into account” if a proper exegesis is 
to be derived. 63   
Since the theological virtue of charity serves as the backdrop to the discussion of 
war, Miller is able to argue that:   
Justified recourse to violence is based on the judgment that the good of protecting the community 
outweighs restrictions on actions that would flow from the good of non-violence implied by Jesus’ 
command.64 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Miller, 187. 
    
63 Andre Marie Dubarle, The Biblical Doctrine of Original Sin (New York: Herder & Herder, 1964), 137.  
  
64 Miller, 186. 
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Adding: 
 
If, in Aquinas’s thought, justice remains unqualified by considerations of charity, then his position 
seems to lack commitments that ought to inform a Christian approach to war.65 
 
Reichberg’s response to this attempt to link a presumptive attitude against harm in 
objection two takes a multi-faceted approach.  One that focuses on the reason why the 
treatise on war is placed within the section of theological charity and another that 
augments certain categorical distinctions overlooked by Miller when these New 
Testament passages are used to support pacifistic ideology.  Reichberg does not directly 
address the prima facie schema set up by Miller to qualify the occurrence of war 
however, only commenting that the implied meaning of Miller’s statements should be 
“expressly rejected with respect to its dual claim that it is sinful to (1) use force in 
resisting evil, and to (2) avenge wrongs.”66 Nonetheless, a contextual look at war to 
ascertain the reason for its positioning within the section of theological charity is worthy 
of a second look, since Miller places so much emphasis on its qualifying role on the 
justifiable use of violence.   
Of the vices listed in opposition to concord in Q. 37, contention, schism, 
quarrelling, war and sedition, Reichberg mentions three – schism, strife, and sedition – 
that Thomas classifies as inherently sinful.  However, war received a special treatment, 
leading Reichberg to surmise that some notable feature set it apart from the other vices.   
Categorizing schism, strife and sedition as sinful modes of behavior would be 
accepted by Miller, agreeing that “Thomas classifies an act as intrinsically good, bad, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Miller, 177. 
 
66 Reichberg, 228.   
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indifferent.”  Adding how “some acts are acceptable or unacceptable by definition.”67  
Schism, strife and sedition would certainly fit this mold.  This being the case, it would be 
safe to presume that Aquinas held a strong presumption against these acts, finding them 
morally reprehensible, deserving of the utmost disdain.  But such a presumption can not 
be affixed to war, since Thomas makes great pains to show how it can be justified, 
devoting an entire quaestio to its permissibility.  No attempt to justify the three other 
vices was offered, again confirming Thomas’s strong belief in their illicit status.  Hence, 
stating that Aquinas held to a presumption against war would make little sense, given his 
attempt to clarify a clear distinction between when the topic of war is first introduced in 
Q. 37, to its re-introduction in Q.40.    
If a reading of Q.40 points to Aquinas stating what benchmarks would make a 
war just, then it is plausible to assume that when war is mentioned in Q.37, Aquinas was 
contemplating those characteristics that would make a war unjust.  Presumably, Aquinas 
had an unjust war in mind when he listed it among the other vices, but wanted to make 
clear to his readers that war in itself can be used as an instrument for good, if fought 
under the proper conditions.  Reichberg is very intent on mentioning this important 
distinction.  For although Aquinas’s positioning of the topic of war within his treatise on 
charity seems ambiguous at first, “it must be emphasized that it was not just war, but 
rather its opposite, unjust war, that dictated the inclusion of the former...”68 Such 
ambiguity is removed when we see how wars fought unjustly, violate the charitable 
grounds in which they ought to be fought.  
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68 Reichberg, Thomas Aquinas Between Just War and Pacifism 224. 
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This argument becomes more persuasive when we read Thomas’s comments 
concerning the proper intentions combatants in warfare ought to possess.  For he thought 
“it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so they intend the 
advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”69 Aquinas continues this thought by 
quoting Augustine, who believed “true religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are 
waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing 
peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”70 The implication of these 
statements is clear. The harboring of unjust intentions in warfare would be a violation of 
the justice called for when engaging in such acts.  To entertain such motives would be 
subject to moral condemnation and therefore, unjustifiable.71 
This argument for wars inclusion within the virtue of charity seems plausible and 
would explain why Aquinas devotes an entire article on the subject emphasizing the 
differences between wars fought unjustly from those fought with honorable intentions.  
War’s first introduction as being part of a list of vices, allows Reichberg to clarify further 
the reasoning Thomas held for its specific placement within the Summa.  “His [Aquinas] 
goal was rather to elucidate how the “fruits of the Spirit,” with charity at their head, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 We find in Reichberg’s other writings support for this when he comments how, “The subject-oriented 
perspective of charity is most visible…in Aquinas’s emphasis on recta intentio, according to which princes and others 
participating in war are to be held accountable for the inward state of emotion that accompanies their decisions and 
conduct on the battlefield.”  See Reichberg, “Aquinas’ Moral Typology of Peace and War.” The Review of Metaphysics 
64, no.3 (March 2011): 470. 
 
70 II-II Q.40 A.1.  Aquinas says that he is quoting Augustine from De. Verb. Dom., however, this quote 
cannot be verified in Augustine’s works.   
 
71 Augustine also is quoted as saying how “the real evils of war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, 
fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power.  To fight under these motives would be in direct 
opposition to virtuous charity.  See Augustine Contra Faustum manichaeum 22.74 
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including peace, are contravened by a set of conflict causing vices.”72 Jeffrey Stout 
recognizes this by asserting “Whether engaging in a particular war is a just act or not 
depends upon such matters as the authority under which it is fought, the cause that 
provides its occasion, and the intentions of those who undertake it.”73  Wars become 
unjust when governing rulers “give sway to hatred, wrath, cruelty or other illicit 
dispositions, they would stand condemned as having acted against the exigencies of 
charity.”74  Aquinas recognized this and sought to amplify this vital point within an 
article specifically devoted to war.   
Toward a Broader Understanding of Just War Ideology 
Turning our attention to the New Testament passages brought up by Miller, 
Reichberg clearly engages with these passages and offers a very competent interpretation 
of their meaning, of which I will address later.  However, I wish to divert somewhat and 
spend some time on these important texts, hopefully offering a broader background 
perspective on why Aquinas saw the need for just war ideology given the express 
teachings of Jesus.   
Advocates of pacifism have maintained how these texts for the non-use of force 
need to be positioned within an eschatological framework in which every day political 
activities are viewed with secondary importance compared to Christ’s proclamations that 
point to the ultimate reality of God’s kingdom that will one day be fully recognized on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Reichberg, “Aquinas’ Moral Typology of Peace and War.” The Review of Metaphysis 64, no.3 (March 
2011). 469.  Miller would agree with this statement.  However, he wants to establish the language of presumption 
against war by arguing how such language signals opportunities to exercise virtue against the breakdown of charity 
with associated safeguards that indicate when a war is fought with immoral intent.   
 
73 Jeffrey Stout Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic 
Tradition.  New York: Greenwood, 1990.  22. 
 
74 Reichberg, 470. 
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earth.  Within the Sermon on the Mount, we see Jesus addressing the issue of retaliation 
by exhorting his listeners “not to resist evil”, but rather to “turn the other cheek to the one 
who strikes you” (Matthew 5:39).  
William J. Danaher Jr. points out that, “This kingdom, of course, has not yet come 
in its fullness. Christians live “between the times,” that is, there is a tension between what 
we now experience and the future consummation of all things in Christ.”75  In light of the 
occupation of the Roman Empire leading to Jewish expectations for political liberation, 
Christ admonishes a non-retaliatory attitude.  The rebellion hoped for and anticipated by 
the Jews is countered by the teaching of Christ, to “love your enemies and pray for those 
who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven.” (Matthew 
5: 44-45).   
However, just war theorists postulate a different perspective from these non-
violent texts.  Their interpretation of the New Testament edicts of Christ are 
counterintuitive to what pacifist advocates take as literal meanings.  Contrary to the non-
use of force, proponents of just war seek justification of their stance by incorporating not 
only the Old and New Testaments, but important philosophical constructs regarding 
morality and natural law. Aquinas asserted that man is “by nature a political and social 
animal”, who needed to be governed because of his natural propensity to be selfish and 
disinterested in the common good.76  Therefore, because of the realities of sin, we see the 
need for the establishment of justice, governance and law as a means of restriction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 William J. Danaher Jr., “Pacifism, Just War, and the Limits of Ethics” Sewanee Theological Review Vol. 
46, iss. 3 (2003): 318.  
 
76 Paul E. Sigmund. St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics: A New Translation, Backgrounds, 
Interpretations. (New York: Norton, 1988), 14,15. 
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Evidence within pagan cultures gives credence to the Thomistic call for a 
governing politic in which justice needs to be recognized.  This acknowledgement of 
man’s awareness of universal truths is none other than the “natural law” in action.  The 
result of coupling its existence with man’s inclination to duplicitous acts can only lead to 
potential conflict and strife.  It is because of this inevitability in which the possibility of 
warfare must be considered.  If so, measures need to be taken as to how a peaceful 
equilibrium can be restored.  
Responding to the pacifistic position, Davis Brown maintains that in order to be 
true to God’s word there must be a recognition that “The God of the Old Testament is 
very much a warrior and the God of the New Testament cannot be divorced from that 
image.  Christianity views God the warrior, God the just, God the merciful, and God the 
loving all as the same.”77 So, although there is an acknowledgement from just war 
theorists of the eventual manifestation of God’s kingdom here on earth at a future time, 
corrective force must be used in this temporal world in an order to restrain wickedness 
and secure the safety of all. 
The institution of an ordained civil government set up by God within the New 
Testament has been established for this very reason.   In order to inhibit sinful behavior 
and provide a level of social order within a society, Paul calls for the submission to the 
governing rulers, for they are “God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be 
afraid for he does not bear the sword for nothing.  He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath 
to bring punishment on the wrongdoer” (Romans 13).  Even still, contentions and 
conflicts are bound to occur.  Sometimes, warfare is inevitable whenever the human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Davis Brown, The Sword, The Cross, and The Eagle: The American Christian Just War Tradition (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008) 
 
	   38	  
passions are present. Just war principles, when properly understood, seek to clarify the 
conditions in which war is to be waged.   
Although Miller seems to feel the divine commands expressed in the New 
Testament provide unequivocal proof that Jesus was against any use of force to hostile 
aggression, an examination of other passages seem to prove otherwise. For example, 
when asked by Pontius Pilate if Jesus was King of the Jews, he responds by saying, “My 
kingdom is not of this world, if it were my servants would fight so that I may not be 
handed over to the Jews (John 18:36).”   If Jesus were against resistance to violence 
unequivocally, why would he say such a statement?  Furthermore, in Luke 3:14-15, we 
see soldiers, who apparently were converts to Christianity, coming to John the Baptist, 
inquiring, “What should we do? (v.14)”.  One would think this was a perfect opportunity 
for John to condemn their occupations as soldiers thereby denouncing all forms of violent 
aggression.  However he does not pursue this course, instead commands them not to 
“extort money… accuse people falsely and be content with your pay” (v.14).  If such a 
career were unsuitable for a follower of Christ, why would John not harshly rebuke the 
soldiers because of their enrollment in soldiery?  
Finally, we see the account also recorded by Luke concerning Cornelius in Acts 
10:1 – 11:18.  From the text, we are able to ascertain two things.  First, that Cornelius 
was a centurion in the Italian Regiment (v.1).  Second, that both he and his family were 
devout, God-fearing people who “gave generously to those in need and prayed to God 
regularly” (v.2).  The text then states how Cornelius converts to the Christian faith in 
response to a visitation from an angel, through the ministry of Peter.  Yet, there is no 
indication from the text of any renunciation by Cornelius of his position as centurion.  To 
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press the matter further, Luke is quick to point out how many of the Ephesians who 
practiced sorcery, renounced their former way of life when they believed the gospel 
message by burning their magical scrolls (Acts 19).  However, a renunciation of a 
military career that was believed to be unfitting for a Christian is not mentioned by Luke 
at all. These apparent omissions, by the New Testament writers, leads Nigel Bigger to 
assert, “If the New Testament regarded participation in the military profession as sinful, 
then surely its authors would have taken care to tell us that soldiers who became 
Christian disciples, renounced their military service.” Yet, we see no evidence of this at 
all. 78   
What Lies Ahead 
As we read these passages, it would be premature to agree with Miller that 
unequivocal proof has been given to substantiate a non-violent stance taken by Christ.   
At best, further elaboration would be necessary for a proper reconciliation between 
Thomas’s article on war and these passages of scripture. To support his case even further, 
Reichberg correctly notices how “While [Thomas] does cite the scriptural passages that 
pacifists had typically advanced in support of their position, in all of this quaestio there is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 In response to this uncomfortable piece of evidence, Richard B. Hays postulates that the appearances of 
soldiers need to be seen in the proper context.  To explain these occurrences, Hays states, “they serve to dramatize the 
power of the Word of God to reach even the unlikeliest people.  They are set beside tax collectors (Luke 3:12-13) as 
examples of how John’s preaching reached even the most unsavory characters.” 
On the surface, this does seem tenable.  However, given the account of Cornelius, Hays’s argument does not 
hold.  Although Luke’s gospel does mention how God warmly receives ‘sinners’, who are engaged in questionable 
occupations, Cornelius is not presented to the reader in this vein.  Quite the contrary, he is portrayed as a God-fearing, 
pious man who earnestly prayed before God on a regular basis.  Attempts to place him together with the ‘unsavory 
characters’, such as prostitutes and tax collectors would simply be untrue and contrary to the text.  
Admittingly, Hays does concede that, “these narratives about soldiers provide the one possible legitimate 
basis for arguing that Christian discipleship does not necessarily preclude the exercise of violence in defense of social 
order of justice.” However, in an effort to salvage his pacifistic viewpoint of the prohibition of force, he later states that 
the New Testament does not depict these positive stories of Christian soldiers fighting or using force in God’s service. 
This may be so; nonetheless, this assertion lies more in the realm of speculation than it does fact.  See Nigel Biggar, 
“Specify and Distinguish! Interpreting the New Testament on ‘Non-Violence’.” Studies in Christian Ethics (2009). 
169; Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament 
Ethics (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 335.  
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not one direct quote from Tertullian, Lactantius, or the other early Christian authors who 
had sought to construct a doctrine of principled objection to war.”79 Despite this 
observation, it becomes evident that Miller’s reading of Aquinas’s reply regarding this 
particular objection becomes the main hinge by which the convergence between just war 
theorists and pacifists can be actualized.   
Upon our return to Reichberg, the spelling out of interpretive understandings of 
two opposing camps (those of the Gentiles and Cathars) during Aquinas’s time begins to 
lay the foundation of categorical distinctions essential for a proper understanding of 
Thomistic justice.  Such justice operating from the political realm inherently involves 
coercive force as a mitigating means of restraint among deviant citizens.  To affix a 
presumptive attitude against war is to deny the very strength by which resort to a just war 
affords, namely to rectify egregious acts of injustice.       
Although Reichberg has effectively laid the necessary groundwork for distinctive 
roles, I believe he falls somewhat short of a comprehensive unfolding of the Thomistic 
idea of justice contained within the Summa.  Since I perceive Miller’s argument 
essentially rising or falling on this important issue, I have offered my own analysis that is 
paramount in answering the question where I believe Aquinas’s ethical orientation really 
resides.  In the following chapter, I will seek to uncover this orientation by exposing a 
categorical error made by Miller in his attempt to characterize Aquinas with a 
presumptive disposition against war.   By showing how Thomas dealt with the topic of 
justice, I seek to uncover differing modes of ethical operation within the sphere of human 
relations that takes into account personal as well as political associations.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Reichberg, 228.   
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            Chapter Five 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CATEGORICAL DISTINCTIONS 
 
In examining Miller’s overall argument, two assertions are recognized in order to 
legitimize a perceived presumption against harm within the mind of Aquinas. The first is 
a move to substantiate the logic of prima facie duties based upon Thomas’s juxtaposition 
of enemy love against the love for the common good.  In chapter two, we found 
extenuating circumstances in which the attitude to love our enemies must at times give 
way to an immediate need to protect innocent lives.80  The second assertion derives its 
conclusion from the first in that an overridden duty is endorsed as a ‘foundational 
presumption’ that ought to exercise its influence over a moral agent’s subsequent acts.  
Here, the convergence hypothesis between just war and pacifism is emphasized, claiming 
a common ethical orientation evident between the two ideologies, namely a presumption 
by both not to harm.   
Regarding the first, competition between prima facie duties does seem evident 
within the writings of Thomas.  The example given by Miller above regarding Aquinas’s 
treatment of sedition is rightly construed within a prima facie conceptualization.  In that 
particular case, the duty toward civic order and peace is measured against any negative 
consequences that may result from the overthrow of a despotic ruler.  Aquinas mentions 
how the overthrowing of a tyrant was justifiable “unless indeed the tyrant’s rule be 
disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the tyrant’s 
government.”81  In another passage we read “if the tyranny is not extreme, it is better to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See page 21. 
 
81 II-II, Q. 42, A.2 
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tolerate a mild tyranny for a time rather than to take action against it that may bring on 
many dangers that are worse than the tyranny itself.”82  Justice would then seem to be 
structured within a hierarchy of values taking its specification by a competing duty that 
serves as a supervening virtue.  
However, Miller takes these instances of competing duties and surmises from 
them a presumptive orientation of nonviolence to the point where it becomes the 
underlying foundational inference for all aspects of human interaction. At first glance, I 
believe Aquinas would agree with Miller’s conjecture; but only to substantiate an ethic 
that should be normative for relationships between private individual members of a 
society.  Thomas would not accept Miller’s understanding of this individual ethic against 
harm as the normative undertow for all fields of human interaction, such as those found 
between sovereign rulers of countries or the intra-state relations between citizens and 
governing officials.  To see this distinction between private members and those found 
within the political sphere, foundational groundwork needs to be laid regarding Aquinas’s 
treatment of justice within the Summa and how this virtue directly correlates to various 
facets of human interaction.  In the following pages, I offer a more comprehensive 
discussion of justice and its appropriate place within human relations.   
The Supervening Virtue of Justice 
According to Aquinas, the virtue of justice “consists of those things that belong to 
our intercourse with other men.”83  While the other virtues seek to appropriately direct 
the inner passions of a man in relation to himself, justice seeks a “special rectification, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Thomas Aquinas, “On Kingship”, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New 
York: Norton and Company, 1988), 23.  
  
83 II-II, Q. 58, A.1 
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not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are 
directed.”84 Hence, according to Thomas, “the object of justice is to keep men together in 
society and mutual intercourse,” adding “this implies relationship of one man to another.  
Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.”85 As with many 
topics addressed by Aquinas, further elaboration and distinctions are necessary to achieve 
a full understanding of how a particular topic is operative within human experience.  
Justice does not escape this rationalization.  For although Thomas has provided a general 
definition of justice; he is quick to point out how this virtue is in need of additional 
specification.  
Through a careful and deliberative approach, Thomas seeks to establish the 
appropriate ethical norms existing within two realms – one between private individuals 
and one between public functionaries - and how justice is the supervening virtue 
operative within both.  In his assessment of the virtue of justice, Aquinas states:  
Justice…directs man in his relations with other men.  Now this may happen in 
two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his 
relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, 
serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its 
proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses.86 
 
From the outset, Aquinas identifies two distinct ways in which justice “directs 
man in his relations with other men.”  One regarding his relation with “individuals”, the 
other regarding his “relations with others in general.”87  His response within this context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 II-II Q. 58 A.2, R.4.  Aquinas’s reasoning is Aristotelian, explaining how the formation of a society is the 
natural outgrowth of human ingenuity, since man is by nature a social animal. 
 
85 Ibid. 
 
86 II-II Q. 58 A.5 
 
87 Jean Porter states how “The discussion of justice is the longest, the most complex, and arguable the most 
difficult treatment of a particular virtue in the Summa Theologica.” She goes on to say how amongst classical authors 
such as Augustine, Cicero and Gregory the Great cited within the Summa “There was a general agreement among 
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seeks to answer the objection given that justice should not be considered a general virtue, 
meaning its benefits do not affect all aspects of human inter-relatedness.  Rather justice 
should be understood as a distinct category, just as the cardinal virtues of temperance and 
fortitude are specified and distinct from one another.   Any species of action would 
therefore derive its categorization from the virtue to which it pertains.  For example, 
prudent acts are specified as such because they derive their status from the virtue of 
prudence.  In the same manner, just acts would find their derivation from the virtue of 
justice.  Any positive effect from a virtue does not overlap into other areas of virtuous 
living.  Understood in this manner, to regard justice as a general virtue applicable to all 
aspects of moral conduct would be an inappropriate appellation.  Its effects as a virtue are 
restricted to itself alone.   
Aquinas disagrees with this assertion, claiming how: 
 [I]t is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to  
that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so 
that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole.  It 
follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in 
relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable 
to the common good: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it 
directs man to the common good.  It is in this sense that justice is called a 
general virtue (italics mine).88 
 
To Aquinas, to view justice as a general virtue is an appropriate specification – 
contrary to the objection just proposed - since all acts of virtue find their ultimate 
expression in the common good.  Hence, since individuals are seen as parts, the virtuous 
life of each is subsumed within the greater organic whole known as the common good.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Aquinas’s sources that justice is a virtue; at the same time, however, there was considerable diversity of views about 
what this means.” Porter is in agreement however with the Thomistic view of justice being nuanced in many different 
perspectives, among them being general and particualr which is relevent to this thesis.  For a fuller understanding see 
Porter’s “The Virtue of Justice (IIa IIae, qq.58-122)”, The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002).  
   
88 II-II, Q.58, A.1 
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Thomas sees a transitive relationship between the virtuous good an individual possesses 
and the benefit it contributes to the welfare of a community.  Justice serves as the 
overarching virtue, since it directs the relations of others within the common good as this 
society moves towards its appropriate ends.  This Thomistic understanding of justice is 
supported by Jean Porter who declares how Aquinas, “draws from Aristotle, that there is 
a kind of general justice that has the common good of the community as its object.”  She 
elaborates further claiming, “understood in this sense, justice is said to be a general virtue 
because it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own object, the common good, which 
transcends the good of the individual toward which the other particular virtues are 
directed.” 89      
In reading Miller, he seems to overlook this important nuance.  He undeniably 
brings up the topic of justice stating how Aquinas “discusses justice not only with 
reference to diminished social arrangements and individual conduct but as a virtue 
simpliciter (italics not mine)”, but no further commentary is offered by him recognizing 
how justice is to be directed toward men in the two distinct ways Aquinas mentions.90  
Recognition of this distinction would seem to prove paramount if any authentic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Porter goes on to say how justice is in a sense “architectonic” with respect to the other virtues. See “The 
Virtue of Justice (IIa IIae, qq.58-122)”, The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002). 273. 
  
90 Miller’s comment regarding the virtue of justice needs to be explained.  He reads Aquinas’s use of justice 
as a “natural and obvious moral response to the prior breakdown of peace.”  Since war is listed as a “sin against peace” 
in the prologue of II-II Q.37, Miller sees Aquinas’s conditions for war as being a direct result of a moral good that has 
been compromised.  These moral goods are “a loss of friendship and fraternal social arrangements”, constituting the 
need for justice.  Since the occasion for war is a result of a sin against charity, Miller is able to insert the presumption 
against harm thesis within Aquinas’s ethical orientation.  He states further that, “The language of a presumption against 
war captures the nonideal circumstances and the associated temptations that form the horizon of political realism 
according to which we are to imagine the moral problem of war.  Applying the virtue of justice to political duty must 
occur against the (unarticulated) background circumstances in which the virtue of charity has been directly 
compromised.”  However, as stated within the text above, Miller does not show the two ways in which justice directs 
man and the appropritate ethical modes of behavior that would be acceptable to both. 
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understanding of the ethical motives driving Aquinas as he deals with the topic of war 
can be achieved.    
In our preliminary study, we have seen the beginning of an unfolding of justice 
which has merely scratched the surface of the many nuances inherent within. So far we 
have determined a specification of justice that allows for its operation in two ways.91  
One that regards how an individual relates to another privately and second how this same 
individual relates to others more generally within the larger framework of society. Stated 
differently, Aquinas offers a distinction that recognizes the virtuous good of a person as 
an individual from the virtuous good of this same individual as a citizen.  Justice was 
found to be a general virtue, directing man’s relationships with others individually and 
corporately as the later moves toward the benefit of the common good.  
Having offered a more concise meaning of justice, Aquinas responds to the 
objection given that since it has been proven that general justice sufficiently directs all 
men in their relations with one another, the need for a particular justice that seeks to 
rectify individual relations would seem superfluous.  Offering his reply, Thomas states: 
Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others.  
As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the 
individual, it does so mediately.  Wherefore there is need for particular justice to 
direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.92   
 
 Notice how an even further qualification is offered by Aquinas, one in which a 
perspective of justice is needed that would “direct a man immediately to the good of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Josef Pieper’s reading of Aquinas identifies three basic relations.  1) the relations of individuals to one 
another (ordo partium ad partes); 2) the relations of the social whole to individuals (ordo totius ad partes); 3) the 
relations of individuals to the social whole (ordo partium ad totum).  I believe 2 and 3 can be viewed as the same.  See 
Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1965), 71. 
 
92 II-II Q.58, A.7; When Aquinas uses the term ‘legal justice’, he means this to be synonomous with ‘general 
justice’.  In II-II Q.58, A.5 r.3. he states, “Wherefore legal justice, may be called a general justice.” 
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another individual.”  This, Thomas identifies as a particular justice and is in contrast to 
the legal justice mentioned that identifies how a man relates to another in regard to the 
common good.  One can only surmise Thomas’s reasoning for this distinction is to set the 
stage for ethical parameters that would be appropriate for each classification of human 
inter-relatedness.  The immediate value general justice brings to a collective body is 
incapable of substantiating the personal ethics that are required between private 
individuals.  To rectify this, Aquinas narrows the scope finding the need for a particular 
justice from which a proper ethic between individuals ought to be derived. Thus, we see a 
bifurcation of justice in which two features are discovered.  One that is operative within 
the realm of the community (general justice)93 along with another that operates on the 
more intimate setting of relations between private persons (particular justice).  As a 
result, the need for a particular justice is not superfluous; in so much as it illuminates this 
distinction between the whole of the common good from the individual persons who 
make up its parts.  This becomes more apparent when Thomas states: 
The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ 
not only in respect of the many and the few, but also under a formal aspect.  For 
the aspect of the common good differs from the aspect of the individual good, 
even as the aspect of whole differs from that of part.94 
 
Since Thomas identifies differences between the realm of the common good and 
that of the particular good, appropriating the same moral ethic for each would make little 
sense. Hence, it is safe to say that a certain form of ethical behavior that is acceptable 
between individuals might be inappropriate or unacceptable within the sphere of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 In his reply whether justice as a general virtue is the same as all virtue in II-II Q.58, A.6 r.4, Aquinas 
declares how “…there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all virtues 
to the common good; and this virtue is legal [general] justice.” 
  
94 II-II Q.58 A.7 r.2 
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common good.  As Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez claims, “the conceptual foundation for this 
response is a distinction between what is permissible for private persons and what is 
permissible for public functionaries.”  He goes on to mention how “this is a longstanding 
distinction in Christian ethics that allows public authorities to do things on behalf of the 
commonweal that are always impermissible for individuals to do in the sphere of private 
life.”95 Even Aristotle maintains “that they are wrong who maintain that the State and the 
home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically.”96  Since distinctive 
qualities exist in a legal justice which recognizes the common good from a particular 
justice that acknowledges the individuals who make up its parts, proper assessments of 
moral behavior would recognize this differentiation when adjudicating matters pertaining 
to justice.  Both aspects of justice should then operate from different systems of ethical 
standards.  
As with Miller, Reichberg also fails to fully develop this concept specified by 
Aquinas.  The only statement with any semblance of this Thomistic thought is 
Reichberg’s comment regarding Christians and self-defense.  There we see that 
“…exposing oneself to harm does not stand contrary to the natural inclination of each 
thing to preserve itself from physical corruption, since it is altogether possible to view 
oneself as a member of a larger whole, a whole that is conserved by this self-sacrificing 
action.”97  Justice and its nuanced characteristics are nowhere to be found within this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez, “A Note on the Relation of Pacifism and Just-War Theory: Is There A 
Thomistic Convergence?” Thomist 59, no.2 (April 1995) 253-4.   
 
96 Aquinas quotes Aristotle from the Politics, i.1. 
 
97 Reichberg, “Thomas Aquinas between Just War and Pacifism.” Journal of Religious Ethics 38, no.2 
(2010). 231.  It must be noted that this is not to say that Reichberg has not addressed this in any other of his 
writings…he may have.  However, the objective of this thesis was to compare certain elements of this article with the 
ones found in Miller’s.   
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claim.  However, we do see Reichberg’s correct interpretation of the Thomistic concept 
of an individual being a part of a larger whole, identifiable as the common good.98  And 
since we have uncovered two forms of justice – legal and particular – by Aquinas, we can 
now see how these ethical norms play themselves out that are based upon what species of 
human inter-relatedness are evident.  
For example, in discussing the matter of fraternal correction, Aquinas states how, 
“The correction of the wrongdoer is twofold.  One which belongs to prelates, and is 
directed to the common good, has coercive force…The other fraternal correction is 
directed to the amendment of the wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely 
admonishes.” 99   From this text, Aquinas unequivocally points out distinctive 
responsibilities that exist between public functionaries from those of private citizens and 
how each should administer correction.    What we notice here is that in order to correct 
those who continue to exhibit unlawful behavior, one form of correction recognizes 
coercive force as a necessary means in order to maintain unified and peaceful relations 
within the realm of the common good. The nature of such force is to be administered by 
those who are in proper authority.  However, Aquinas also expresses another form of 
correction, one that does not involve force, but seeks to effect change within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 It also must be noted the context in which Reichberg makes this statement.  He is addressing the New 
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wrongdoer through means of admonishment.  Evidently, this form of correction is 
reserved for those friendships that are private and more intimate in nature.    
The distinctive roles and their accompanying duties emerge even further when we 
see Aquinas stating, “It is permissible to kill a criminal if this is necessary for the welfare 
of the whole community.  However this right belongs only to the one entrusted with the 
care of the whole community…”100John Courtney Murray agrees claiming, “Force is the 
measure of power necessary and sufficient to uphold…law and politics.”101 Ethical 
parameters that entail constrain are totally acceptable as a means for control and the 
overall welfare of the community.  “As the highest representative of the warrior class, it 
is the king’s duty to use force against those internal and external enemies who would 
threaten the just and righteous order of society.”102  The maintaining of peace would 
necessarily entail restrictive measures appropriate for the use of those in proper authority.  
Thomas goes on to say “such correction should not be omitted…” admitting that if a man 
is unwilling to alter his wicked behavior, “he should be made to cease sinning by being 
punished…since the order of justice is observed…”103  
However, in contrast, such disciplinary action would be impermissible as a mode 
of correction between private individuals.  Instead, here Aquinas states that the way in 
which correction should be administered in this type of relationship is one of 
admonishment only, in the hopes that the offending person would see the error of their 	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way and pursue a more lawful course of action.  The ethical orientation between 
individuals should not exhibit any measures of coercive force, instead should consist of 
verbal warnings only.   When all efforts of admonishment fail, Aquinas sees nothing 
morally suspect in allowing governing authorities the right to intercede by way of capital 
punishment.  
We see this line of reasoning emerge once again when Aquinas responds to the 
inquiry whether it is lawful to kill sinners.  There he states, “…if a man be dangerous and 
infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous 
that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good…” 104  Thomas again 
acknowledges ethical distinctions between private persons and civil officials, stating  
such an action can only be “entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: 
wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death”105 
He thus qualifies a form of ethical proceeding that is permissible to governing authorities 
but impermissible and inappropriate to private persons. So, for Aquinas, the way in which 
justice is administered is relative and distinguishable between the types of relationships 
within a social community. What would be ethically acceptable for relations between 
public functionaries and the common good, are not acceptable in relationships between 
private friendships.   
So, we see supportive evidence of two distinct spheres of human relations at 
work.  Each of them operates from different ethical norms and responsibilities.  
Associated with the duties of civil magistrates is a component of governance that may 
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call for the justifiable use of force.  Thomas sees this force against a member of society as 
beneficial and contributive to the overall good of a community, “in so far as it applied to 
a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin.”106  He goes on to mention 
elsewhere within the Summa how “In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment 
itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin,” adding how 
such a punishment “partakes of the nature of justice…”107 The maintenance of any 
society, which acknowledges a form of general justice, inherently involves the coercive 
use of force as a mitigating measure to safeguard the common good against egregious 
moral acts.    
Miller views Thomas’s assessment of justice within a qualified framework that 
can be traceable to considerations of charity.  To be sure, Darrell Cole sees this 
assessment “as the model for Christian participation in war, thus making love rather than 
justice the controlling factor in using just force.”108  However, this assertion fails to take 
into account Aquinas’s deliberative breakdown of justice and how it should be applied to 
different categorizations of human interaction that distinguishes relations between private 
individuals from those involving the governance of society.      
This being the case, Miller’s interpretation of Aquinas’s reply to the second 
objection in question 40, in which war is seen as sinful due to the divine commands of 
Matthew 5:39 and Romans 12:19, does not take into account the ethical norms germane 
for which public functionaries must adhere for the protection of a social community.  
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Miller’s analysis falls short of the justification for a presumption against harm by failing 
to notice the various specifications of justice Aquinas goes at great length to discuss.  
The dispositional attitude to always be ready to love your enemies must therefore 
be understood as an ethic to which a particular justice is practiced between private 
individuals.  Such a justice would condemn personal retaliatory force in the face of evil.  
However, given that the nature of human relations entails a general justice, such force 
would be an acceptable course of action in order to curtail any maladaptive behavior from 
influencing the common good.  Thomas seems to be alluding to this distinctive element 
when he states how “God works in all things without exception whatever is right, yet in 
each one according to its mode.”109  
Harm to individuals, when done through the proper mode of authority, is morally 
acceptable to Aquinas.  It is the harming actions of those who don’t have the authority to 
do so that is reprehensible in his eyes and deserving of strong reproof.  Recognizing the 
importance of these distinguishing roles sheds light on how the divine commands of 
Matthew 5:39 and Romans 12:19 should be read.  Daryl J. Charles acknowledges this 
importance, agreeing how “the injunction not to resist evil, contextually, must be located 
in the realm of personal injury, not state policy…In the sphere of the private, justice does 
not call for retribution.  In the sphere of the public…justice demands retribution.”110 With 
that said, no presumptive attitude against warfare and killing within the mind of Aquinas 
is evident.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 II-II Q. 64 A.4 
 
110 Daryl J. Charles, Between Pacifism and Crusade: Justice and Neighbor Love in the Just War Tradition. 
Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, no. 4 (2005). Endnote 21 
	   54	  
            Chapter Six 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The recent use of analytical tools accessing war through prima facie duties along 
with a presumptive language against harm has brought about a reconstruction of 
Aquinas’s writings. Joseph E. Capizzi has recognized that current formulations of war 
within a prima facie concept is becoming “influential even if historically the application 
of the prima facie logic to just war thinking is a recent arrival.”111 The reality of global 
destruction through nuclear means has caused deep concern for scholars such as J. Bryan 
Hehir who sees “The substantive reason for placing a presumptive restraint on war as an 
instrument of politics as…entirely necessary.  Both the instruments of modern war and 
the devastation of civilian society which has accompanied most contemporary conflicts 
provide good reasons to pause (analytically) before legitimating force as an instrument of 
justice.”112  
We have already witnessed the Catholic Church’s effort to acknowledge a 
convergence between just war ideology and pacifism. However, this anachronistic 
method has garnered the question whether such a conceptualization of war, through 
prima facie means, was evident within Thomas’s mind.   
Miller has been forthright in his attempt to synthesize the writings of Aquinas to 
show a meta-ethic of nonviolence that presumably shares a starting point with just war 
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ideology.113  He views any attempt by scholars to show Aquinas possessing a negative 
attitude toward war through these analytical means, as warranted.   
However, from an examination of his main points, I find his belief of a 
presumptive orientation that favors non-violence unconvincing.  Therefore, I am 
compelled to say that those who wish to reconstruct Aquinas along these lines are not 
justified in doing so. Of the main points offered by Miller, the two that seem to carry the 
most weight (the stacking of objections and the New Testament passages that condemn 
personal retaliation) were unable to substantiate a pacifistic presumption against war with 
Aquinas when the Summa Theologica was examined in fuller detail.  
 Reichberg’s explanation of Thomas’s reason for the use of objections was 
successful in instilling doubt against the higher synthesis theory Miller asserted.  The 
discovery of a Thomistic presumption against a particular idea when the stacking 
hypothesis was applied to other passages of the Summa was shown to yield conclusions 
Aquinas would have undoubtedly rejected.  Therefore, the claim that the objections of 
war “enshrine[d] nonviolent values to be the basis for impelling moral inquiry into the 
ethics of war,” can’t be validated when the bona fide reason for how Thomas used 
objections to an article’s inquiry was explained.   
Likewise, the assertion that a scholastic article was “meant to impel inquiry into a 
doubtful matter”114 was indefensible given the recognizable pattern within the Summa 
showing readers how Thomas was going to respond to an article based upon its opening 	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objection. If the first objection would make an argument for the illegitimacy of a 
particular act, this would immediately tip the reader off that Aquinas was going to 
contravene the assertion to show how the act was legitimate.   The article on war in 
IIaIIae showed no exception to this established pattern.  The illicitness of war as a 
presumption against its implementation was clearly contested by Aquinas, showing how 
such characterizations toward war were misguided and in need of further elaboration, 
which Thomas goes at great length to offer in his responses.    
It would make sense then, why the theological virtue of charity served as the 
backdrop from which Aquinas formulized his treatise on war.  For Thomas, war was 
perfectly licit if fought within certain parameters.  The sole purpose of these conditions 
was to safeguard against unjust motivations that would lead to a violation of charity.  
From this theological framework in which he operated, Joan Tooke is able to conclude 
“For Aquinas, Christian revelation elevated just warfare to a divine activity, and affected 
the spirit of love, justice, and punishment in which it ought to be fought.”115 Echoing this 
sentiment is Reichberg, who sees Christian participation in war as “not merely 
permissible, but, if carried out for the common good, and with due restraint, it represents 
an exercise of true virtue.”116  Understood along these measures, the apparent reason for 
Q.40’s appearance within the treatment of charity, “may be that for Aquinas, war under 
the specified conditions is motivated by and an expression of virtuous love for others.”117 
A prima facie conceptualization, in which the duty to use force is pitted against 
the duty not to harm, does not therefore seem to be within the ethical purview of Aquinas 	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when discussing war.  On the contrary, his rebuttals to the objections listed in Q.40 were 
successful in illustrating why the use of coercive force assumes a presumption against 
egregious acts of injustice, not, as argued, a presumption against harm.  If a presumption 
against harm were in the forefront of Thomas’s epistemology, then an obvious question 
would have to be asked why he believed “it is sometimes right and meritorious to make 
war?” 118 An ethical disposition that favored nonviolence would not make sense given 
this statement.  When all of these points are collectively presented, demonstrations to 
show a Thomistic ethical disposition against war and harm, becomes unlikely.   
Further Challenges to the Prima Facie Schema 
But aside from the compelling reasons just offered, I see at least three additional 
challenges to the prima facie logic.  The first calls for a deeper look at what I believe to 
be an unspoken assumption the prima facie model states when trying to legitimize 
coercive force.   
Discussions regarding war through prima facie grounds as a whole seems to raise 
some interesting questions relating to presuppositional content. One cannot simply take a 
neutral stance toward the given data we see from the reality of life in which we live. 
The reason I raise this issue is because I feel it is relevant to the current topic.119 To be 
more specific, in formulating the prima facie paradigm, Miller seems to advocate a 
neutral stance when judging between two competing duties.  Based upon the evidence 
each duty offers, a moral judgment can then be made as to the appropriate course of 
action.  In the case of war, the presumptive duty not to harm is pitted against the duty to 	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protect innocent lives. When all the evidence for each is weighed, it will become evident 
which duty will come to the fore. One may look only at the features pertinent within each 
and through the use of reason; the right duty to which we are obligated to follow will 
eventually emerge.   
However, it seems to me that this type of neutrality employed is one that is 
illusory and cannot be used by an analysis of brute facts alone.  Just as an operating 
system runs programs on a computer, so to the moral judgments we make are funneled 
through our pre-existing operative worldview.  A purely neutral stance would not and can 
not be possible given our engrained proclivities.  Applying this to prima facie logic, it 
would seem that what is operative in its moral analysis of presumptive duties is an 
unspoken presupposition that serves as an implied standard of measurement used to 
adjudicate between them.  
Jeffrey Stout seems to show what this presuppositional commitment is when 
stating “What it [the prima facie schema] lacks is a theory of justice.  And [Miller’s] 
view that we ought to recognize the prima facie duty of non-maleficence as having force 
without help from a view of justice is every bit as controversial as any Thomist’s theory 
of justice.”120     
I agree wholeheartedly with Stout.  An implied resort to justice seems to be 
already presupposed within the mind of Miller.  For presumably, it would not be just to 
allow innocent lives to be sacrificed at the expense of a presumptive orientation that 
negates any use of force.  Justice would call for the immediate protection of life over 
gratuitous suffering.  In that case, the historical understanding of Aquinas’s treatment of 
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war making an appeal to justice bears itself out.  I have shown how the overarching virtue 
of justice operative within the categories of human interaction recognizes distinctive roles 
between private and public functionaries.  That being said, I wonder if the whole notion 
of categorizing the justification of war through prima facie means would in the end be 
superfluous, since a presuppositional view of justice is already implied within its makeup.     
A second challenge I see with the defining of war through prima facie means 
involves the inescapable concessions just war and pacifism must make in order for a 
convergence between the two can be posited. Joseph Capizzi has commented that 
inevitably “by interpreting just war and pacifism within a system of prima facie duties, 
the convergence thesis circumnavigates the core theological convictions of each 
tradition…”121 To be more specific, an overt compromise between both positions (just 
war and pacifism) would undoubtedly have to be admitted if the prima facie stratagem 
were implemented.  On the one hand, the absolute pacifist would have to lower her 
ethical standard in order to allow for an ideology that goes against her strongest 
convictions.  On the other hand, the just war theorist would have to concede in a starting 
point that would question the use of means by force as a legitimizing counteractive to 
obvious manifestations of evil.  It would be fair then to question the significance prima 
facie obligations can contribute if ideological stances lose their defining statues within 
such a conceptualization.   
Lastly, I wish to take up what I feel is the most telling concern afforded by the 
recent advent of prima facie logic and for that matter, modern analytical tools of 
interpretation in general.  And that is focused upon the concept of truth itself.  We are 	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witnessing before our very eyes “large sectors of academia…” in which “truth has 
become such a contested category that no debate is more intense than whether truth can 
be known at all.”122  The recent reinterpretation initiated against Thomas Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologica is a small sampling of the consequential outcomes inevitable once 
postmodern attitudes toward truth are entertained.  It would seem that no historical work 
from past writers is beyond the reach of the hand of deconstructionism.123   The 
penetrating trends of cultural ideas are serving to be an influencing force as the 
worldview of human secularism takes more of a prominent role.  This coupled with a 
disregard for theism as a rational belief are causing many within the realm of academia to 
resist any belief system seeking to express itself as authoritative and absolute.  
When the analytical tools proposed by Miller are used as an interpretive means 
toward any piece of literature, the undoubted result, I feel, is a compromise of original 
intent. Such methodologies that adopt a postmodern worldview jeopardize the very nature 
of truth itself. Analytical “reassessments” of important theological as well as political 
works opens the door to relative stances and reinterpretations.  The admitted 
“reconstruction” of Aquinas’s ethical orientation is just one example of an interpretive 
attempt vying for equal authoritative status from the political and theological realms.  As 
a consequence of such an approach, truth has become to the human mind what beauty is 
to the beholder.  The seeking of its objective meaning will be replaced with a cultural 
consensus, rather than what the author truly intends.    
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James T. Johnson has encapsulated this thought, commenting how the 
presumption against war hypothesis is “not based on an unchangeable moral principle, 
but on a condition in the world that is not only subject to change but fated to change.” 124   
He sees a rejection of the classical just war position in favor for an ideological trend that 
is more representative of the current cultural movement than anything else.  If these 
trends continue, then it will be interesting to see if Aquinas’s thoughts on war will 
undergo another revision two hundred years from now. 
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